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Abstract
Students Alice and Bob take an examination in their quantum me-
chanics class, and thereby illustrate some aspects of energy decoher-
ence.
1Participating Guest, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
Electronic address: JLFINKELSTEIN@lbl.gov
1
Quantum mechanics is a beautiful theory. It is also, in the hands of
skilled practitioners, a wildly-successful theory for microscopic phenomena,
in spite of the contradiction between the world as we experience it and
the superpositions of macroscopically-distinguishable states which (at least
naively) would seem to be implied by unitarity of evolution in time.
The “time” in which quantum states are supposed to evolve unitarily is
a parameter, not a dynamical variable of the theory. On the other hand,
any actual determination of time would involve the reading of a real clock,
which is a physical (and hence a quantum) system. It has been suggested (for
example, in refs. [1]–[5]) that one should study the evolution of a quantum
system not with respect to an abstract time parameter, but rather with
respect to the reading of a clock considered as a physical system. I will refer
to this reading as the “relative time”. As I will review below, the evolution of
a quantum system with respect to a real (and hence not infinitely-accurate)
clock will involve decoherence in energy of that system, and it has also
been suggested (for example, in refs. [5]–[7]) that decoherence in energy
could at least alleviate the alleged conflict between quantum predictions for
microscopic phenomena and the appearance of the macroscopic world.
A seemingly-different approach (which does not involve the explicit con-
sideration of clocks as physical systems) is to assume that in fact the evo-
lution of quantum states is not unitary, but rather that unitary evolution
is supplemented by collapse onto states of definite total energy [7]–[9]. I
will refer to these theories as “energy-driven collapse theories,” and will re-
view below the fact that in these theories quantum states experience energy
decoherence just as they do in relative-time calculations.
It would certainly be interesting if it could be shown that either relative-
time calculations or energy-driven collapse theories made predictions for mi-
croscopic phenomena which could be experimentally distinguished from the
predictions of standard quantum theory. This possibility suggests several
questions. For example, if one performs an experiment using a real (hence
not infinitely-accurate) clock and hopes to observe evidence of energy de-
coherence, one might ask whether the existence of a more-nearly-accurate
clock somewhere else in the universe could affect the decoherence one was
hoping to detect. Not surprisingly, the answer to this question is “no” (and
I do not mean to imply that any of the referenced authors have ever sug-
gested otherwise), but in contemplating similar questions it might be helpful
to consider a simple story [10] in which standard non-relativistic quantum
theory is supposed to hold exactly, and in which it is assumed that there
is an arbitrarily-accurate clock, but which will nevertheless lead to energy
decoherence of the type mentioned above.
2
Let us then imagine that two students whose names are Alice and Bob
are taking an examination for their class in quantum mechanics. They are
told that there is an isolated quantum system Q whose time-independent
Hamiltonian is HQ, and which at time t = 0 is in the state ρQ(0). They are
asked what is the state of that system “now” (i. e., at the time the question
is asked).
There is a clock on the wall of the examination room, which for the
purpose of this story I take to be infinitely accurate and capable of being
read with infinite precision. Alice looks at this clock, and sees that it reads
a time I denote as tA; she sets h¯ = 1, and writes as her answer
ρQ,A(tA) = e
−iHQtAρQ(0)e
iHQtA . (1)
Bob does not look at the clock on the wall; instead, he looks at his
inexpensive wristwatch, which reads a time I denote as tB. Since he knows
that his wristwatch is not accurate, he does not assume that the actual time
(i.e., the time shown on the wall clock) is equal to tB; from his experience
with the watch, he assigns a probability density I denote as P (t|tB) for the
actual time to be t given that his watch reads tB . He has learned in class
that, if the time were surely t, the state of the system Q would be
ρQ(t) = e
−iHQtρQ(0)e
iHQt; (2)
since he thinks that the time is t with probability P (t|tB), his answer to the
examination question is [11]
ρQ,B(tB) =
∫
dt P (t|tB)e−iHQtρQ(0)eiHQt. (3)
From equations 1 and 3, we can see that
ρQ,B(tB) =
∫
dt P (t|tB)ρQ,A(t). (4)
It has been pointed out by Poulin [12] that this equation arises from
relative-time calculations. Also, a special case of this equation arises in
energy-driven collapse theories. To see that, take P (t|tB) to be a Gaussian
in (tB − t) with width proportional to
√
tB, that is, take
P (t|tB) = (2piλtB)−
1
2 exp(−(tB − t)2/(2λtB)); (5)
then eq. 4 can be re-written, with the variable η = (tB − t)/
√
λtB , as
ρQ,B(tB) = (2pi)
− 1
2
∫
dη e−η
2/2ρQ,A(tB − (λtB)
1
2 η). (6)
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This is the same expression for the quantum state as Pearle [13] has shown
to arise in collapse theories. Thus properties of ρQ,B will also be valid in
either relative-time or energy-driven collapse theories. This is true even
though in the story of the quantum-mechanics exam I had stipulated that
quantum states evolve unitarily (with no modification for collapse) and that
there does exist an arbitrarily-accurate clock; Bob just does not happen to
have looked at it.
Here are some properties of the states assigned by Alice and Bob:
• If P (t|tB) were given by δ(t− tB) (that is, if Bob’s watch were in fact
completely accurate) then it would follow from eq. 4 that ρQ,B = ρQ,A.
Also, ρQ,B = ρQ,A if ρQ,A(t) is constant for those values of t for which
P (t|tB) 6= 0. (That is, it would not matter that Bob does not know
what time it is if ρQ,A did not depend on time.) But in general,
ρQ,B 6= ρQ,A.
• Under unitary time evolution a pure state remains pure. If ρQ(0) is
a pure state, then ρQ,A will be pure also, but ρQ,B need not be pure.
In fact, in the case in which ρQ,A is pure, eq. 4 gives an ensemble
decomposition for ρQ,B. According to Bob, the initially-pure state
ρQ(0) has evolved into the mixed state ρQ,B.
• Consider matrix elements of ρ in a basis of energy eigenstates. From
eq. 1,
[ρQ,A(tA)]i,j = exp(i(Ej − Ei)tA)[ρQ(0)]i,j (7)
If Ei = Ej (and a fortiori if i = j) then [ρQ,A(tA)]i,j is independent
of tA, and so from eq. 4 [ρQ,B(tB)]i,j is also independent of tB ; in fact
in this case [ρQ,B]i,j = [ρQ,A]i,j. But if Ei 6= Ej , eqs. 4 and 7 show
that |[ρQ,B(tB)]i,j | < |[ρQ,A]i,j|; this implies that there is decoherence
in energy. And if P (t|tB) is sufficiently broad as a function of t, then
[ρQ,B(tB)]i,j → 0, in which case ρQ,B(tB) becomes independent of tB
(even if ρQ,A(tA) is not independent of tA); I will call this “complete”
energy decoherence.
Now suppose that N represents an observable of the quantum system
Q, and that Alice and Bob are each asked to calculate the expected
value of N . Alice will calculate 〈N〉A = Tr[NˆρQ,A], and Bob will
calculate 〈N〉B = Tr[NˆρQ,B]. In the case of complete energy deco-
herence, 〈N〉B will be independent of tB , although 〈N〉A need not be
independent of tA.
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• Suppose that system Q is composed of two subsystems S and C which
are dynamically independent, i.e. that HQ = HS +HC ; suppose also
that these two subsystems are initially uncorrelated, i.e. that ρQ(0) =
ρS(0) ⊗ ρC(0). Then ρQ,A(tA) will also be a product: ρQ,A(tA) =
ρS,A(tA)⊗ρC,A(tA), but ρQ,B(tB) will in general not be a product [14].
If Bob were asked to write the state of S he could either, in analogy
to eq. 3, write
ρS,B(tB) =
∫
dt P (t|tB)e−iHS tρS(0)eiHS t, (8)
or he could calculate
ρS,B(tB) = TrC [ρQ,B(tB)] (9)
with ρQ,B(tB) given by eq. 3; he would get the same answer either
way. Similarly, Bob could calculate ρC,B(tB) = TrS [ρQ,B(tB)], but
ρQ,B would not in general be equal to the tensor product of ρS,B and
ρC,B.
• Now suppose that N is an observable of the subsystem S, and that
subsystem C is itself a clock (which will be assumed to agree arbitrarily
well with the clock on the wall). Let T be an observable of C, with
orthonormal eigenvectors {|t〉}, and take [15]
ρC,A(tA) = |tA〉〈tA|. (10)
Alice and Bob are each asked the following question: “If N and T were
now measured and the value of T were found to be t, what would you
expect for the value of N?”
Alice knows that the value t agrees with tA, so she could simply write
〈N〉A = Tr[NˆρS,A(tA)]. (11)
Alternatively, she could calculate (letting [〈N〉|t] denote the expecta-
tion value of N given that t had been found)
[〈N〉|t]A = Tr[NˆPtρQ,A(tA)]
Tr[PtρQ,A(tA)]
(12)
where ρQ,A(tA) = ρS,A(tA) ⊗ |tA〉〈tA|, and Pt projects C onto |t〉; of
course she would get the same answer either way.
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Bob can calculate
[〈N〉|t]B = Tr[NˆPtρQ,B(tB)]
Tr[PtρQ,B(tB)]
(13)
where
ρQ,B(tB) =
∫
dtAP (tA|tB)ρS,A(tA)⊗ |tA〉〈tA|, (14)
and since Tr[ρS,A ⊗ |t〉〈t|] = 1 and Tr[NˆρS,A ⊗ |t〉〈t|] = Tr[NˆρS,A],
Bob will find that
[〈N〉|t]B = Tr[NˆρS,A(t)]. (15)
Thus even though 〈N〉B is in general different than 〈N〉A (in fact,
in the case of complete energy decoherence 〈N〉B is independent of
tB while 〈N〉A need not be independent of tA), Bob gets the same
expression for [〈N〉|t] as does Alice. The reason that 〈N〉B and 〈N〉A
differ is that Alice knows what time it is and Bob does not. However,
since the reading of the internal clock C and the wall clock agree,
once Bob learns the value found for the observable T he does know
what Alice knows, and so his expectation for N is the same as Alice’s.
For Alice, S and C are not correlated; for Bob they are, and by using
eq. 13 he exploits this correlation (as represented in ρQ,B) to reproduce
Alice’s result: [〈N〉|t]B (in eq. 15) is the same function of t as 〈N〉A
(in eq. 11) is of tA.
• Let’s again think of Q as a single system, and let N be an observable of
Q. Say Bob is asked the following question: “If you were to look at the
clock on the wall and see a time t, what would you expect to find for
the value of N?” He could of course just do what Alice does; he knows
that if the clock on the wall reads t then the state of Q is as given in
eq. 2, and that 〈N〉 = Tr[NˆρQ]. However, suppose for some reason he
in enamored of the procedure described previously, which is to consult
his watch rather than the wall clock to write a quantum state, and
then to find the expectation of N from that quantum state. He could
consider the compound system consisting of Q together with the wall
clock, in which case the wall clock would be an internal clock of that
compound system, so he could proceed as above: write the state of
the compound system as in eq. 3, and then find the expectation of
N given that the wall clock reads t, as in eq. 13 (with the compound
system replacing Q in those equations). Of course he would get the
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same answer either way, just as his result (eq. 15) agrees with Alice’s
result (eq. 11).
The moral of this story is that although ρQ,B(tB) exhibits energy deco-
herence (and in the extreme case of complete energy decoherence is inde-
pendent of tB), nevertheless if Q contains a subsystem which is an accurate
clock (or, which amounts to the same thing, if Q can be expanded so as
to include such a subsystem) then Bob can recover the time dependence of
a quantum system as seen by Alice by considering the correlation between
that system and the internal clock. This story might help us to interpret
energy-driven collapse theories. Those theories postulate that unitary evo-
lution of quantum states is supplemented by collapse onto states of definite
total energy [16]. As shown in eq. 5.6a of Pearle [13], in these theories the
state of a quantum system Q at time t is given by
ρQ(t) = (2pi)
− 1
2
∫
dη e−η
2/2(ρQ)
U (t− (λt) 12 η), (16)
where (ρQ)
U represents what the state would be if it did evolve unitarily,
that is
(ρQ)
U (t) := e−iHQtρQ(0)e
iHQt. (17)
The theory of ref. [6], also, leads to an expression for ρQ which is essentially
identical to that in eq. 16.
The relevance of the story of the quantum-mechanics exam is, of course,
that the expression for ρQ,B given in eq. 6 is the same as that for ρQ given
in eq. 16. So now we can ask what an energy-driven collapse theory would
imply for the time-dependence of the expectation value of some observable
N of some quantum system S. One way to answer this question would be
to apply eq. 16 to the compound system Q consisting of S together with a
clock. The clock would then be an internal clock; just as Bob, in spite of the
energy decoherence of ρQ,B can reproduce the time-dependence as seen by
Alice by considering the correlation between S and the clock, so too would
the time dependence of 〈N〉 (with respect to that clock) as predicted by
an energy-driven collapse theory be exactly the same as that predicted by
standard quantum theory, i.e. without energy-driven collapse. This result
has been shown in some detail by Simon and Jaksch [17]; see also ref. [18]
for a similar result for the theory of ref. [6].
On the other hand, Pearle [13] has suggested a second way in which
one might calculate the time dependence of 〈N〉 in an energy-driven col-
lapse theory: take Q in eq. 16 to be just S by itself, and say as usual that
〈N〉 = Tr[NˆρQ(t)]. But then, as pointed out by Pearle, there seems to be a
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paradox: although according to the first method of calculation 〈N〉 agrees
with standard quantum theory, according to the second it does not; for ex-
ample, in the case of complete energy decoherence, the second method would
imply that 〈N〉 was constant even if the first implied it was not constant.
Since any clock could be considered to be a quantum system, it is difficult
to see how the first method of calculation, which applies the evolution pre-
dicted by an energy-driven collapse theory (eq.16) to the combined system
of S and the clock, could be incorrect within that theory. Because within
such a theory the value of t is not directly accessible (since clocks as well
as anything else are supposed to suffer energy-driven collapse), one might
perhaps deny the validity of the second method of calculation. One would
thereby avoid Pearle’s paradox, but at the cost of allowing that the theory is
observationally completely equivalent to standard quantum theory. It seems
then that these theories, if interpreted to be non-paradoxical, not only do
not lead to testable predictions for microscopic phenomena which differ from
those of standard quantum theory but also do not help to reconcile quantum
theory with the observed macroscopic world.
Whether or not there is energy-driven collapse, as long as one has a
sufficiently-accurate clock one should expect that results of experiments on
microscopic systems would agree with predictions of standard quantum the-
ory. But since, as stressed in refs [1]–[5], real clocks are not infinitely accu-
rate, this agreement would not be exact. This is illustrated in the story of
the quantum-mechanics exam by the fact that ρQ,B does not coincide with
ρQ,A; if Bob does not use an accurate clock his expectation for measure-
ments on Q will not be the same as Alice’s. Note that the mere existence
of an accurate clock does not affect Bob’s analysis. Bob could have written
eq. 3 even if there were in fact no clock on the wall; the clock on the wall
makes no difference to Bob if he does not look at it.
More generally, any experiment will involve apparatus—clocks, lasers,
whatever—which necessarily have some inaccuracy. And whether this inac-
curacy comes from limits set by quantum gravity (as suggested in ref [5]) or
from the more mundane fact that the apparatus may be cheaply manufac-
tured, it can certainly influence the experimental results. In any experiment,
it is important to understand the accuracy of the apparatus which is actu-
ally used; the possibility of more-nearly-accurate apparatus somewhere else
in the universe is not relevant.
Added note: After the original version of this paper was posted, I
noticed an (earlier) paper by Bartlett, Rudolph and Spekkens (BRS) [19],
and I realized that the story of the quantum-mechanics exam can also serve
as an illustration of points made in that paper. BRS argue that whether
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or not coherences (i. e. off-diagonal elements of ρ) vanish can depend on
the way the system is described. That is what does happen with Alice
and Bob; in the case I have called complete energy decoherence (which is
the case in which Bob’s wristwatch is no good at all) matrix elements of
ρQ,B between states of different energy vanish, while those of ρQ,A might
not. Thus Bob plays the role of the “fictionist”, and Alice the role of the
“factist” mentioned in the title of BRS. BRS argue further that the choice
of description would not lead to different predictions for experiments. Since
neither Alice nor Bob has made any mistake, they certainly would not give
contradictory predictions, and in the case in which Q has a subsystem which
is an accurate clock, eqs. 11 and 15 show that their predictions would be
the same. In the terminology used by BRS, the clock-subsystem of Q serves
as an “internal reference frame”, the clock on the wall as an “implicated
external reference frame”, and Bob’s watch, if sufficiently inaccurate, as a
“nonimplicated external reference frame”.
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